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COUNTERING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING THROUGH TANZANIA’S SEA PORTS
Leanne Little
TRAFFIC is a leading non-governmental organisation working globally on trade in wild animals and plants in the context of both biodiversity conservation and sustainable development.

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The Wildlife Trafficking, Response, Assessment and Priority Setting (Wildlife TRAPS) Project, financed by USAID and implemented by TRAFFIC, in collaboration with IUCN, is designed to develop and deliver a suite of ground-breaking partnerships and pioneering approaches to tackle wildlife crime between Africa and Asia. Wildlife TRAPS uses targeted assessments, collaborative action planning, and innovative approaches to identify and advance interventions that can break trafficking chains and disrupt organised criminal networks.

UNDP-GEF Project "Reducing Maritime Trafficking of Wildlife between Africa and Asia": Implemented by UNDP between 2018 and 2021, this project under the GEF-financed, World Bank led Global Wildlife Program aims to curb maritime wildlife trafficking, targeting key routes and transit points between Africa and Asia.

The GEF launched the 7-year Global Wildlife Program (GWP) in June 2015, bringing together funding from the GEF and a wide range of partners, including the Governments of participating countries, GEF Agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, foundations, the private sector and civil society. Twenty GWP national projects are currently under implementation in 19 partner countries across Africa and Asia, including Tanzania.

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Wildlife trafficking is the illegal cross-border trade in live wildlife, wildlife products or their derivatives, both of fauna and flora. It is one of the most lucrative types of transnational crime along with the illegal trade in drugs, counterfeit goods and human trafficking (IUCN, 2019). High profit and low risk have lured a wide variety of participants, from professional poachers to transnational organised crime groups, eager to satisfy and profit from the demand (Global Financial Integrity, 2017). Levels of illegal trade of many species including African Elephant, pangolins and rhino have reached unprecedented levels due to the high demand for wildlife elsewhere, specifically South-East Asia (IUCN, 2019). The impacts of illegal wildlife trade are significant and far-reaching, from the extinction of iconic species, to economic losses that effect the livelihoods of local communities, and threatens sustainable development, good governance, rule of law and security (Chatham House, 2014; UNODC, 2017).

Maritime transport is essential to the world’s economy as over 90% of the world’s trade is carried by sea (United Nations, 2019) and traffickers rely heavily on this mode of transport (C4ADS, 2018). The vulnerabilities in transportation and customs capability are being exploited by criminal traffickers to move illicit wildlife products (Anon, 2019). African sea ports that serve regional and international trade provide traffickers with multiple smuggling routes and the container shipping industry facilitates the movement of wildlife goods (Global Financial Integrity, 2017; Anon, 2019a). Maritime companies and their assets, wittingly or unwittingly, complicit in wildlife trafficking may be faced with legal, financial and reputational risks (Anon, 2019b).

INTRODUCTION
The major sea ports of the United Republic of Tanzania (henceforth referred to as Tanzania) are Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, which will be the target ports for the stakeholder workshop. Other notable sea ports in Tanzania include Tanga and Mtwara, as well as smaller ports or jetties for the three principal lakes of Victoria, Tanganyika and Nyasa (Anon, 2019c). Tanzania’s ports collectively provide a series of vital links between the Indian Ocean, the hinterland of Tanzania and the country’s landlocked neighbours of Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These ports sustain Tanzania’s national economy by facilitating trade and generating income to help the Government fund essential public services (Tanzanian Ports Authority, 2018).

Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar ports are situated on key maritime routes and provide Tanzania with access to international markets. Tanzania’s main trading partner in 2017 was India (by value in US$ and weight in tonnes) and other significant trading partners were Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, Viet Nam, China and Switzerland (Chatham House, 2019). A range of products were exported by Tanzania to these trading partners (amongst others) in 2017 (Figure 1) and maritime trade is possible with all of them except for the landlocked countries of Switzerland and Zambia (Chatham House, 2019). Furthermore, Tanzania is a member of the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, these organisations promote trade between member nations as well as the EU and the United States (Anon, 2019d). Trade data in relation to these organisations indicate that Kenya is Tanzania’s key regional trade partner, closely followed by Zambia, Uganda and Burundi (Chatham House, 2019).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOP 5</th>
<th>PRODUCT</th>
<th>VALUE IN US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Precious Metals — Gold</td>
<td>1.55 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vegetable Products — Coconuts, Brazil Nuts, and Cashews</td>
<td>612 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foodstuffs — Raw Tobacco</td>
<td>345 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Foodstuffs — Coffee</td>
<td>160 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Animal Products — Fish Fillets</td>
<td>157 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1: Top 5 products exported by Tanzania in 2017*
The Port of Dar es Salaam is the principal sea port for mainland Tanzania (Tanzanian Port Authority, 2018), and one of East Africa’s leading freight gateways due to its strategic geographical position and capability to receive large numbers of cargo vessels that serve regional and international trade (Anon, 2019c; Anon, 2019e). The Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) manages and operates this port alongside the country’s system of coastal and lake ports (TPA, 2018).

**DAR ES SALAAM PORT**

The Port of Dar es Salaam is the principal sea port for mainland Tanzania (Tanzanian Port Authority, 2018), and one of East Africa’s leading freight gateways due to its strategic geographical position and capability to receive large numbers of cargo vessels that serve regional and international trade (Anon, 2019c; Anon, 2019e). The Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) manages and operates this port alongside the country’s system of coastal and lake ports (TPA, 2018).

There are 11 deep-water berths at the Port of Dar es Salaam; the TPA operates seven berths whilst the remaining four berths and Kurasini Inland Container Depot (ICD) are leased to and managed by a private operator, Tanzania International Container Terminal Services, which is a subsidiary of Hutchison Ports (Anon, 2019f). In addition, there are 12 privately licenced ICDS all within a 12 km radius of the port, with a combined handling capacity of 13,900 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) (TPA, 2018).

The Port of Dar es Salaam drives Tanzania’s economy as it handles over 90% of Tanzania’s international trade and in 2017, about 60% of the containerised cargo was for Tanzania and the remaining 40% was for landlocked countries, notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia (TPA, 2018).
The port’s cargo handling capacity is expected to double under the Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project (DMGP) that was unveiled in July 2017 by the Tanzanian President (Anon, 2019g). DMGP involves several port modernisation projects including strengthening and deepening the berths, dredging the entrance channel and construction of a new terminal jet, which is designed to double overall throughput capacity, reduce vessel waiting time and improve the efficiency of the Port of Dar es Salaam for the benefit of public and private stakeholders (World Bank, 2019; Anon, 2019h). The current inefficient state of the port acts as a constraint against trade and limits economic expansion for both Tanzania and for neighbouring landlocked countries (World Bank, 2019).

**ESTIMATES ABOUT DAR ES SALAAM PORT**

**IN 2017**

58% OF CONTAINERISED CARGO was for domestic consumption and 42% in transit

DAR ES SALAAM HANDLES 600k+ TEUs or 10 million tonnes of containerised cargo per year

**APPROXIMATELY 95% of Tanzania’s international trade is handled by the Port of Dar es Salaam**

**TICTS HANDLES ~85% of containerised cargo whilst TPA handles the remaining 15%**

All statistics listed above were extracted from the TPA Port Handbook, 2019 – 2020.
Zanzibar, Pemba Island and several smaller islands form the Indian Ocean archipelago of Zanzibar, which is a semi-autonomous territory in political union with the United Republic of Tanzania (Anon, 2019i; Anon, 2019j). Unguja (also known as Zanzibar Island) is the largest and most populated island, separated from the Tanzanian mainland by a channel which at its narrowest point is approximately 36 km (22.3 miles) across (Figure 2).

This island hosts Zanzibar’s main airport, Abeid Amani Karume International Airport that serves domestic and international flights, as well as the major sea port of Zanzibar (also known as Malindi). The main port and four others located on Zanzibar and Pemba island are managed by the Zanzibar Ports Corporation and regulated by the Zanzibar Maritime Authority (Zanzibar Ports Corporation, 2019; Anon, 2019e).

The Port of Zanzibar has two berths (next to each other), one for cargo and the other for ferries and passengers’ boats (Anon, 2019e). It is the main entry point handling international trade for the islands of Zanzibar and about 95% of imports and exports pass through this port (Anon, 2019k). In 2016 the Port of Zanzibar handled 75,000 TEU transited the port and activity since has increased which has led to congestion and storage space issues (Anon, 2019e). Currently the port accommodates one large container ship vessel and six feeder vessels from smaller shipping lines per week (Anon, 2019l). To address this, Zanzibar is planning to build a new multipurpose port at Maruhubi area, approximately 2 km north of the current port with the Chinese company, China Harbour Engineering Company (Anon, 2019m).
Tanzania is a biodiversity hotspot with one of Africa’s most significant elephant populations which had recently faced unprecedented levels of poaching, driven by the illegal ivory trade (EIA, 2014). Tanzania, alongside neighbouring countries, Kenya and Uganda have been implicated in this trade for the last decade, linked as source and exporters of ivory as well as transit countries for consignments gathered from elsewhere (CITES, 2018). Large-scale ivory seizures intercepted outside of Tanzania ca. 2013 indicated unabated poaching and trafficking of the country’s elephant populations and reinforced the need for a national strategy to combat poaching and the illegal wildlife trade.

In 2014, Tanzania established a National Elephant Action Plan, a National Ivory Action Plan (NIAP) and a national strategy to combat the illegal wildlife trade (World Bank, 2019b). Under the NIAP process, Tanzania has significantly improved legislation and law enforcement performance, resulting in more arrests, prosecutions and higher penalties to address ivory trafficking (CITES, 2018).
TRAFFIC’s wildlife trade information system includes seizure data from a wide range of sources such as open source media reports, datasets from other NGOs, information from law enforcement agencies and government reports. Although TRAFFIC endeavours to only use information it believes to be reliable, reported seizures may not be a true or complete representation of all seizures or illegal trade. Seizures are also likely to depend on the ability and willingness of a country to target illegal wildlife trade which may vary over time due to a variety of factors. For open source media reports, it is often difficult to make an informed decision as to the reliability of the source and TRAFFIC is unable to cross-reference or corroborate information for all reports. Although reported seizures are an imperfect indicator of the volume of illegal wildlife trade, they do provide an insight into species being traded illegally and the modus operandi of the trade.

Based on analysis of data within TRAFFIC’s wildlife trade information system, the table below (Figure 3) provides the number of reported seizures per year between 2009 and 2018 that linked either, Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar (including their sea ports) as an origin, transit or discovery location of an illicit wildlife product. The majority of seizures that linked to these locations involved ivory, which was found in various forms, from whole tusks to smaller derivatives such as bangles. Other illicit wildlife products seized included lion products (teeth or claws), big cat skins, rhinoceros horn, tortoises, shark fins, wild meat and timber.

Although Tanzania’s international airports are viable trafficking nodes, the sea ports have been used as export and transit hubs for wildlife trafficking (UNODC, 2013). The strategic location of the Port of Dar es Salaam and to a lesser extent, the Port of Zanzibar provides traffickers involved in wildlife trafficking with access to international trade routes and markets as well as the container shipping industry. Container shipping is a cost-effective transport method for moving commodities particularly large or heavy items such as ivory or timber and the risk of detection by law enforcement is, generally speaking, minimised (Milliken, 2014). The last available reported seizure that linked the Port of Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar Port was in August 2015, largely due to an increase in enforcement efforts by Tanzanian authorities. However, criminals involved in the illegal wildlife trade are frequently adapting routes, methods of concealment and timings to avoid inspection by law enforcement. The target sea ports remain vulnerable to exploitation, especially as criminals involved in wildlife trafficking are operating nearby in the Dar es Salaam region as there were 27 seizures between 2016 and 2018.

Figure 3: Number of reported seizures per year between 2009 and 2018 where Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar was linked as either the origin, transit or discovery location of an illicit wildlife product (including their sea ports).
Criminals based in Tanzania and the East Africa region have utilised Tanzanian’s port connectivity to move illegal products such as wildlife, timber, narcotics, arms and precious minerals from source to consumer countries (Anon, 2019a). Although it is difficult to infer trade route trends using seizure data, the available data linked to the locations of Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar and their sea ports suggest that, over time, trade routes have become more complex as criminals attempt to evade detection by law enforcement. The movement of illicit wildlife products appears to shift away from direct shipments between source and destination locations and makes use of transit countries before reaching destinations in Asia (Moneron et al, 2017; C4ADS, 2015).

**TRANSIT LOCATIONS**
- Kenya
- Malaysia
- United Arab Emirates
- Qatar
- Sri Lanka
- Singapore
- Philippines
- Taiwan Province of China

**DESTINATION LOCATIONS**
- People’s Republic of China (abbrev. China)
- Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR)
- Viet Nam
Zanzibar was identified as a transshipment port for two seizures of timber in 2014 (Anon, 2019n; Anon, 2019o) and another in 2015 (Anon, 2019p) all of which originated from Madagascar, transited the Zanzibar Port and were destined for Asian countries. Open source reporting related to the 2015 seizure revealed that the company involved was using a fraudulent CITES export permit, discovered when traders attempted to use the certificate number for exporting livestock from Tanzania (Anon, 2019q).

Hong Kong SAR was identified as a destination location for the 2014 seizures, and a transit location for the 2015 seizure. A TRAFFIC report focused on Madagascar’s timber trade reinforces that Zanzibar is a transshipment location for timber bound for China and Hong Kong SAR (Ratsimbazafy et al, 2016).

Tanzania alongside other East Africa countries, Kenya and Mozambique are exporters of ivory from the African continent (Milliken, 2014). The table below (Figure 5) provides the number of reported seizures between 2009 and 2015 and the weight of ivory seized at the ports of Dar of Salaam and Zanzibar, as well as consignments seized at other ports that originated or transited these sea ports.
Figure 4: Ports implicated in seizures of ivory that originated from Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar port

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IVORY</th>
<th>ORIGIN PORT</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>HONG KONG</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>MALAYSIA</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
<th>VIET NAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam Port</td>
<td>No. of seizures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weight (Kg)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,586</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>8,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar Port</td>
<td>No. of seizures</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weight (Kg)</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Number of reported seizures and weight of ivory seized at Tanzanian target sea ports between 2009–2015, as well as consignments seized at other ports that originated from Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar port

A total of 15 reported seizures and over 23,000 kg of ivory was seized that was linked to the target sea ports of Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar, although these figures are likely significantly higher as the estimates are derived from information reported within multiple open sources. Regardless, they provide an insight into ivory trafficking from Tanzania’s target sea ports. Figure 5 also indicates the other countries involved in ivory trafficking and their ports are key nodes in the trade chain (Figure 4). The key transit ports were Kenya’s Mombasa port, the Malaysian ports of Klang and Penang as well as the Port of Manila in the Philippines. Hai Phong port in Viet Nam was highlighted as a destination location.
Concealment of illegal wildlife products in container shipments varies in sophistication; some methods will be highly sophisticated such as the use of specialised containers with hidden compartments, and others are less sophisticated such as the use of concealment materials. These materials are usually legitimate bulk products that are found within the country of origin and can effectively disguise the physical presence and sometimes the smell of an illegal wildlife product.

From the seizures reported, plastic declared as “used” or “recycled” was used the most (a total of four seizures) to conceal illicit ivory shipments that were destined for China and Viet Nam via Malaysia (EIA, 2014).

Other seizures revealed other commodities that are traded internationally by Tanzania were also being used to conceal illicit wildlife products, these include:

**AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS**
- Sunflower Seeds, Snail Shells

**METALS AND MINERALS**
- Black Lead Ore, Stones

**MARINE PRODUCTS**
- Seaweed, Dried Fish, Anchovies
The products listed above demonstrate that criminal networks exploit legitimate Tanzanian businesses or potentially even manage to hide their involvement in wildlife trafficking.

Illicit ivory in particular was often cut into smaller pieces, packaged into multiple boxes, bags or sacks and hidden amongst large quantities of legal products to avoid raising the suspicions of port officials and law enforcement. The latter involves a degree of planning and co-ordination by the criminals. Furthermore, shipping containers that originated from Tanzania were mis-declared or mis-labelled and this is a technique used by wildlife criminals to avoid inspection by law enforcement. Containers for six incidents were declared or labelled as construction materials such as “plastic”, “rubber” or “copper ore”, whilst two containers were declared as fish related products such as “seashells”, “dried fish” and “anchovies”.

Similar concealment methods were used to hide illicit wildlife products within personal or business premises within the Dar es Salaam region and at Tanzania’s main airport, Julius Nyerere International Airport. With regards to the latter, ivory pieces were wrapped in carbon papers and lion teeth and claws were in nylon bags with the belief that the materials would reduce the chance of detection by airport scanners.

Illicit ivory was also seized from personal or business premises within the city of Dar es Salaam. For example, in November 2013, over 1,800 kg of ivory concealed within sacks of garlic and army ammunition was seized from the house of three Chinese traders who reportedly imported this commodity and exported marine products from Tanzania (Anon, 2019r).
Organised crime groups (OCGs) exploit national and international business norms to hide their identities and involvement in wildlife trafficking (C4ADS 2015; OECD, 2016), and their methods include but are not limited to:

**FRONT COMPANIES**  
Creation of front companies with limited business, legal and financial information to book shipments

**BRIBERY**  
Bribery to corrupt individuals and businesses, particularly those associated with bulk products, to facilitate their activities

**BILL OF LADING ALTERATIONS**  
Last-minute alteration of a Bill of Lading to obscure true origin/route/destination of a shipment

**DOCUMENTATION FRAUD**  
Involving inadequate or incomplete information on the Bill of Lading about the consignor, consignee, ownership and business activities (including financial feasibility and transactions) related to the shipment
Legitimate maritime companies particularly container shipping companies, freight forwarders and vessel owners, wittingly or unwittingly, may be complicit in wildlife trafficking as OCGs can use the methods listed above.

The transnational nature of organised crimes such as wildlife trafficking adds a layer of complexity to law enforcement investigations as information about companies involved in the trade chain may involve multiple jurisdictions. It is uncommon for all companies involved in the trade chain to be named, particularly those based in source countries and usually consignees at the destination location or vessels involved in the final leg of journey are named.

Consequently, very few Tanzanian-based maritime companies have been named as complicit in wildlife trafficking (EIA, 2014), whereas companies associated with the destination location of the shipment and international maritime companies have been named as complicit in relation to wildlife trafficking and Tanzania.

**CONTAINER VESSEL**

The container ship, Hub Enzo (IMO: 9109988) was involved in an ivory (over 6 kg) shipment in March 2009 that reportedly originated from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (left the port in January 2009) (Anon, 2019t). The container containing the ivory was moved onto this vessel at a Malaysian port and seized at the Port of Hai Phong in Viet Nam. This vessel and its owner at the time, Hub Marine Pte Ltd, were named as complicit in the media for transporting the illicit ivory shipment between Malaysia and Viet Nam, although many others formed part of the trade chain i.e. vessel linked to voyage from Tanzania to Malaysia, and were not named publicly by either the Vietnamese or Tanzanian law enforcement.

Further investigation at the point of seizure of vessel and container movements along the entire illicit trade chain is crucial to identifying patterns and trends in the maritime routes used by criminals involved in wildlife trafficking. The container ship, Hub Enzo is now named, Verizon and is owned by an Indonesia-based company (Anon, 2019u).
Based on data from TRAFFIC’s wildlife information system, four Vietnamese companies and two international container shipping companies were involved in transporting illegal ivory shipments that originated or transited Tanzania. However, in reality, many other companies from various transportation sectors were involved but not named.

A Vietnamese company, Tien Hoang Company Limited reportedly based in Quảng Ninh province in north-eastern Viet Nam was the alleged consignee (named recipient of a shipment) for a container with about 500 kg of ivory hidden amongst scrap metal in boxes, which were seized by officials at the Port of Hai Phong, Viet Nam (Anon, 2019s). The container was mis-declared as rubber. The ivory consignment was in a container with a serial number that had the prefix, MSKU which refers to the world’s largest shipping company, Maersk Line. The bill of lading number had the prefix, SAFM which refers to the international shipping company, Safmarine.

Larger maritime companies involved in the illicit trade chain are identifiable by unique serial/reference numbers that facilitate the supply chain of the maritime sector. However, other nation State’s companies that are consignees for shipments are unlikely to have unique references so additional research is required. It is common for criminals to use companies that have generic names which have no correlation to the shipment and vague addresses to obscure their involvement in wildlife trafficking.
ORGANISED CRIME AND CORRUPTION

The planning, collection and smuggling of large quantities of wildlife products demonstrates a high degree of co-ordination that is indicative of OCGs (Global Financial Integrity, 2017; UNODC, 2013). Criminal networks exploit benign operating environments with international transportation nodes and apply bribery techniques to influence individuals that can facilitate their activities. Several years ago, Tanzania was implicated in multiple large-scale wildlife seizures which indicates that OCGs had exploited the country’s sea ports and officials to enable wildlife trafficking amongst other types of illicit trade. Zanzibar port has also been implicated in similar types of trafficking.

THE CHINESE IVORY QUEEN AND TANZANIAN ORGANISED CRIME LEADS

In February 2019, a Tanzanian court sentenced Yang Feng Glan, a Chinese businesswoman known as the “Ivory Queen” to 15 years imprisonment for being the leader of an organised crime syndicate as well as accused of smuggling over 700 elephant tusks from Tanzania to Asia between January 2000 and May 2014. Yang had used her societal and business connections in Tanzania, the wider region and with overseas Chinese-owned companies to identify customers and source assistance leading a syndicate to organise, manage and finance the poaching and trafficking of ivory in Tanzania and the wider region.

Two Tanzanians, named as Salvius Matembo and Manase Philemon were Yang’s accomplices and were also sentenced to 15 years in prison on the same counts. This case demonstrates that the Tanzanian authorities are committed to prosecuting and sentencing high-profile traffickers for their involvement in organised crime and wildlife trafficking (Anon, 2019v; Anon, 2019w).
The presence of organised crime in a country is indicative of corruption throughout multiple levels of society (RUSI, 2015) and poses a threat to wildlife conservation. Indicators of corruption may be deliberate or slight in nature thus difficult to detect until after an incident has occurred. Examples include forgery of shipping documentation, intentional mis-declarations on documentation and assisting the transportation of illegal shipments through customs screening without proper and/or any inspection. Corruption reduces the effectiveness of conservation programmes, reducing law enforcement and political support as well as establishing incentives for the overexploitation of resources, adversely impacting both people and biodiversity (Musing et al, 2019).

This needs to be addressed as a central part in any approach to tackling wildlife crime and trafficking, alongside concerted commitments from the highest levels of Government to customs and law enforcement officials to defeat the illegal wildlife trade (TRAFFIC, 2019).

This paper provides basic information about two sea ports in Tanzania; Dar of Salaam and Zanzibar and provides evidence of their involvement in wildlife trafficking. Whilst there have been no reported seizures linked to these target sea ports since August 2015, there have been seizures of illicit wildlife products in the region of Dar es Salaam in recent years. Whilst Tanzania has made significant progress to combat wildlife trafficking in recent years, the ports and associated companies are vulnerable to exploitation by criminals operating within its borders, regionally and internationally. The analysis within this paper provides crucial information on key trafficking routes and concealment methods that have been used to move illicit wildlife products from and via Tanzania to consumer countries.

SUMMARY
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TRAFFIC Report: Tanzania’s Sea Ports
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TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring network, is a leading non-governmental organisation working globally on trade in wild animals and plants in the context of both biodiversity conservation and sustainable development.

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