

February 2020

**COUNTERING WILDLIFE
TRAFFICKING THROUGH**

KENYA'S SEAPORTS

WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS



JOINT REPORT

Countering wildlife trafficking in KENYA'S SEAPORTS

TRAFFIC is a leading non-governmental organisation working globally on trade in wild animals and plants in the context of both biodiversity conservation and sustainable development.

The Wildlife Trafficking, Response, Assessment and Priority Setting (Wildlife TRAPS) Project, financed by USAID and implemented by TRAFFIC in collaboration with IUCN, is designed to develop and deliver a suite of ground-breaking partnerships and pioneering approaches to tackle wildlife crime between Africa and Asia. Wildlife TRAPS uses targeted assessments, collaborative action planning, and innovative approaches to identify and advance interventions that can break trafficking chains and disrupt organised criminal networks.

The UNDP-GEF Project "Reducing Maritime Trafficking of Wildlife between Africa and Asia": Financed by the GEF and implemented by UNDP between 2018 and 2021, this project under the GEF-financed, World Bank led Global Wildlife Program aims to curb maritime wildlife trafficking, targeting key routes and transit points between Africa and Asia. The GEF launched the Global Wildlife Program (GWP) in June 2015, bringing together funding from the GEF and a wide range of partners, including the governments of the now 29 participating countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, GEF Agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, foundations, the private sector and civil society.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) / World Customs Organization (WCO) - Container Control Programme (CCP) was developed to assist governments in establishing sustainable enforcement structures called Port Control Units (PCU) in seaports and seeks to improve the risk profiling capacities of port control officials to fight illicit trade of drugs, weapons, counterfeit products, wildlife products, and other trafficked items, in containerised transport. The PCUs are a multi-agency unit comprised by enforcement officers from Customs and other relevant enforcement authorities such as Police, Port Authority, wildlife services and others according to the threats relevant to the country. Since its inception in 2004, more than 100 operational PCUs in more than 55 countries worldwide have been established, including in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in Eastern Africa.

The World Wide Fund for Nature WWF is an independent conservation organisation, with over 30 million followers and a global network active in nearly 100 countries. WWF's mission is to stop the degradation of the Earth's natural environment and to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature, by conserving the world's biological diversity, ensuring that the use of renewable natural resources is sustainable, and promoting the reduction of pollution and wasteful consumption.

Published by:
TRAFFIC International, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

© TRAFFIC 2020. Copyright of material published in this report is vested in TRAFFIC.

ISBN no: 978-1-911646-19-8

UK Registered Charity No. 1076722

Design by Marcus Cornthwaite




TABLE OF CONTENTS

page 1

INTRODUCTION

Background and workshop objectives
Opening remarks

page 3

SETTING THE SCENE AND FRAMING THE ISSUE

An overview of wildlife trafficking through maritime supply chains
Perceived vulnerabilities at the Mombasa port
Stakeholder perspectives entering the workshop
Maritime supply chains—challenges and opportunities

page 14

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES

Best practices from across sectors
Diving deeper into solutions, actions and strategies
Kenya Wildlife Service and the K9 Unit

page 20

GENERATING SOLUTIONS AND COLLABORATION GOING FORWARD

International initiatives: opportunities for Kenya's Mombasa port
Mapping priority actions
Next steps and closing remarks

page 29

**ANNEX
IMAGE CREDITS**

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AEO	Authorized Economic Operator
AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
BMC	Border Management Committee
CCP	UNODC/WCO Container Control Programme
CFSA	Container Freight Stations Association
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CTS	Cargo Targeting System (by WCO)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EACC	Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
FAL	Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic
FEAFFA	Federation of East African Freight Forwarding Associations
FI	Financial Investigations
FIATA	Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations
GEF	Global Environmental Facilities
GWP	Global Wildlife Program
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
ICMS	Integrated Customs Management System
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
IWT	Illegal Wildlife Trade
JPCU	Joint Port Control Unit
KFS	Kenya Forest Service
KPA	Kenya Ports Authority
KPS	Kenya Police Service
KRA	Kenya Revenue Authority
KMA	Kenya Maritime Authority
KSAA	Kenya Shipping Agents Association
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
LE	Law Enforcement
MIKE	Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants
MOTW	Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIS	National Intelligence Service
ODPP	Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
PCU	Port Control Unit
PIC	Port Improvement Committee
PMAESA	Port Management Association for Southern and East Africa
RECTS	Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System
ROUTES Partnership	Reducing Opportunities for Unlawful Transport of Endangered Species
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SfG	Space for Giants
TRF	The Royal Foundation
TSA	Ten Senses Africa
TWIX	Trade in Wildlife Information eXchange
UfW	United for Wildlife
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WCO	World Customs Organization
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The workshop was generously supported by funds from the GEF, USAID, UNODC, and WWF and technical contributions from the WCO and The Royal Foundation.

This report was made possible with support from the American people delivered through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through the Wildlife Trafficking Response, Assessment, and Priority Setting (Wildlife TRAPS) project.

The contents are the responsibility of TRAFFIC and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of USAID, the U.S. Government, the GEF, UNDP, UNODC, and WWF.



INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND AND WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES

Increasing demand for wildlife products, especially in Asia, is threatening many animal and plant species such as Black Rhinoceros *Diceros bicornis*, African Elephants *Loxodonta africana*, and African pangolins (*Phataginus* and *Smutsia* sp.). Every year, the illegal wildlife trade (IWT) displaces billions of US dollars of national revenue from developing countries to the criminal individuals and networks involved in this crime. Traffickers exploit legitimate transport, logistics services and international trade routes to move wildlife and their products illegally from source to consumer countries. Most of the ivory (72%) and pangolin scales are

trafficked by sea in containerised cargo due to the high volumes involved and the minimal risk of interception and arrest. Kilindini Port, also referred to as Mombasa Port—Kenya's and East Africa's largest seaport—is highly vulnerable to wildlife trafficking: of almost 55 tonnes of ivory intercepted between 2002 and 2017, Mombasa Port was involved or inferred to be involved (Little and Outhwaite, 2020). This highlights its strategic location and why it is exploited by criminals. Strengthening port law enforcement capacity as well as the security of maritime supply chains are therefore critical actions in the fight against wildlife trafficking.

To address the threat of wildlife trafficking through Kilindini Port and other Kenyan seaports, a three-day Port Stakeholder Workshop was convened in Mombasa by the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife of The Republic of Kenya (MOTW) in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), wildlife trade specialists TRAFFIC, and the World Wide Fund for Nature-Kenya (WWF-Kenya), with technical support from the World Customs Organization (WCO) and The Royal Foundation (TRF).

73 representatives from MOTW, Kenya Port Authority (KPA), Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), Customs representatives from Uganda, Tanzania,

Nigeria, and Viet Nam, shipping companies and private sector associations, UN organisations, USAID, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), along with national and international experts on wildlife trade and maritime issues, participated in the event on 23rd–25th October 2019. Overall, representatives from a total of 12 countries from 31 organisations were engaged in the workshop.

The workshop provided a vibrant space to foster stakeholder engagement and collaboration to counter illegal wildlife trade through Mombasa and other Kenyan seaports, involving a rich-mix of presentations, group-work and interactive plenary sessions to achieve the following objectives:

- 1 Generate practical solutions** and supporting mechanisms to tackle wildlife trafficking effectively through Kenya's seaports.
- 2 Deepen understanding of the detrimental impacts** brought to the country, port and maritime industry through wildlife trafficking;
- 3 Assess current efforts and identify key gaps and opportunities** in the port management systems and stakeholder practices to prevent, detect and intercept wildlife trafficking as well as other illicit trade;
- 4 Introduce the UNDP-GEF (Global Environment Facility) Project "Reducing Maritime Trafficking of Wildlife between Africa and Asia"**, the USAID funded Wildlife Trafficking, Response, Assessment and Priority Setting (Wildlife TRAPS) Project implemented by TRAFFIC and IUCN, the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme, and private sector-led initiatives through members of the United for Wildlife Transport Taskforce, along with showcasing best practices and technology from other sectors.

OPENING REMARKS

The workshop was officially opened by Hon. Najib Balala, Cabinet Secretary, Kenya Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife on behalf of the Government of Kenya and Ms. Julie Thomson, Director East Africa office, TRAFFIC on behalf of the supporting partners, who in their welcoming remarks emphasised that:

1. Trafficking of fauna and flora is often an organised transnational crime that requires international and inter-agency co-operation as well as a multi-sectoral approach to address it effectively.
2. There is a need to stop trafficking right from source in Africa.
3. There have been considerable efforts to stem wildlife trafficking in Kenya, but vulnerabilities still exist.
4. Anti-corruption efforts should be upheld and strengthened to counter IWT.
5. This workshop is a timely opportunity to foster multi-stakeholder engagement and strengthened collaboration, as well as to complement implementation of Kenya's National Wildlife Strategy 2030.

“ Wildlife trafficking utilises transport networks to commit crime that robs countries like Kenya of their natural resources and heritage. Kenya has been a leading player in combating IWT together with other partners, but stronger collaboration is needed to sustain the momentum. Various players in the maritime transport sector have already joined hands to combat trafficking through seaports and their involvement in the supply chain security and safety is vital. We hope that this workshop will provide a platform for open and constructive discussions and identifying next steps for action.”

Julie Thomson

Director East Africa office
TRAFFIC

“ This workshop directly responds to the Kenya Wildlife Service's Strategic Plan and Wildlife Agenda 2018–2022. Actions emanating from the workshop will also help complement Kenya's Government efforts in the implementation of strategic objective 2.2 of the Kenya National Wildlife Strategy 2030 on reducing poaching, illegal trade and overutilisation of wildlife resources. Key actions envisaged in the strategy include enhancing capacity to tackle poaching and improve co-ordination amongst stakeholders in countering IWT.”

Prof. Fred Segor

Principal Secretary State Department
of Wildlife, Kenya Ministry of Tourism
and Wildlife

“ Trafficking is considered a victimless crime, but it has many casualties such as negative impact on livelihoods. The huge profits in trafficking allow criminals to infiltrate legitimate businesses, which has negative effects on many ports globally, and especially in Africa and Asia. Kenya has invested a lot of money in anti-poaching efforts and in technology at the ports. While efficiency has improved, corruption still persists, and the Government is working tirelessly to uproot it. Trafficking has to be brought to a halt, and wildlife crime made unprofitable and extremely uncomfortable.”


Hon. Najib Balala

Cabinet Secretary, Kenya Ministry of
Tourism and Wildlife



SETTING THE SCENE AND FRAMING THE ISSUE

Following the opening remarks, Day 1 of the workshop began with two introductory presentations that enabled participants to appreciate fully the scale of national, regional and global impacts brought by IWT, as well as ports' vulnerabilities to trafficking, specifically Mombasa port.



AN OVERVIEW OF WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING THROUGH MARITIME SUPPLY CHAINS

Tom Milliken, Senior Advisor – Elephant and Rhino Trade, TRAFFIC

The presentation highlighted global and regional implications of wildlife crime, emphasising the considerable role maritime transport networks and seaports play in wildlife trafficking and preventing IWT. Containerised shipping is particularly attractive for transport of IWT products due to its cost-effectiveness and the high volume of cargo involved, which are often subject to fewer restrictions and customs inspections. Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and Zanzibar ports have historically played key roles in ivory trafficking as exit points connecting the African hinterland with the rest of the world. Based on TRAFFIC's records of over 30,000 elephant product seizures globally, there has been an escalation in ivory trafficking activity since 2008, peaking in 2011 and 2012, with some modest decline subsequently. However, the volume of ivory trafficked continued to increase through 2015 because of the increasing number of large-scale ivory movements (i.e. >500 kg per seizure) from Africa to Asian destinations. The CITES's Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) programme, which tracks elephant poaching, also showed major increases in illegal killing across Africa during this period. For example, in 2015, the Tanzanian government publicly recognised a 60% reduction in its elephant population since 2009. Throughout the period 2012–2017, Kenya, and particularly Mombasa port, was at the epicentre of ivory leaving the African continent. During the same period, significant ivory volumes were trafficked through West Africa's ports (mainly Togo and Nigeria), with the criminal networks adapting to detection capacity improvements by employing new trade routes such as through Turkey. Other

unanticipated developments included the use of new air routes to move ivory from East Africa to West Africa (especially Nigeria and Togo) for international export. The share of Kenya's involvement in large-scale ivory movements accounted for 35% of the total between 2012 and 2014 (based on seizure data) but declined to 17% between 2015 and 2017.

High-level economic growth in China has fuelled the latest IWT crisis, especially illegal ivory trade. The country's increasing population (1.39 billion) and growing middle class (over 500 million people) has unleashed high demand for luxury products such as ivory and remains a major driver of IWT. The emergence of foreign nationals from Asia (mainly China and Viet Nam), operating through Africa-based transnational criminal syndicates, has led to their almost total control of the illegal ivory supply chain from Africa to Asia. Indeed, not since colonial times, have foreign nationals played such a decisive role in Africa's ivory trade. There have been some positive developments from China, where domestic ivory trade was banned at the end of 2017. This may have contributed to the decline in ivory trade volumes in 2016 and 2017. However, 2019 has been showing a major upward trend again, with an increasing number of large-scale ivory seizures (including the three largest seizures since 1989 (including the largest, 9.1 tonnes of ivory in Viet Nam in April 2019).

Mombasa plays an important "catchment" role for ivory, as the final exit point of the so-called "northern corridor" that links trade routes from

interior East and Central Africa with the rest of the world. Criminal syndicates adapt quickly and scaled-up co-ordination amongst governments and other players is needed to combat IWT. Criminal networks often hide behind shadow companies, mislabel contraband as other products, hide consignees through last minute alterations to the bill of lading or use corruption to escape detection. Seaports and airports are natural bottlenecks for wildlife trafficking

and provide opportunities for detection and interception of wildlife crime. Scanners provide a good solution to detect ivory and other wildlife in containers. However, scanners are traditionally only used for imports and not exports. Sniffer dogs can also be employed to detect IWT with improvised technology, e.g. through air suction from containers. Information flow and co-operation across jurisdictions and countries is essential for defeating wildlife crime.

MARITIME SUPPLY CHAINS MAPPING, SECURITY CHALLENGES AND VULNERABILITIES OF MOMBASA PORT

Duncan E. Omondi, Regional Coordinator for Eastern Africa, Institute for Security Studies

The project Enhancing African Response to Transnational Organised Crime (ENACT) studied vulnerabilities of Mombasa port in the face of increased IWT and other illicit trafficking. The study was based on the crime theory that seaports are both crime generators and crime attractors.

The study targeted 65 respondents from government agencies and private sector entities connected to Mombasa port. The study found that illicit trade through Mombasa port has huge annual costs for business (up to USD300 million) and government (up to USD60 million). One of the key vulnerabilities for the port represents weak port control due to low capacity, leading to weak enforcement of laws and policies. The low capacity emanates from an ownership and management system influenced more often than not by political considerations rather than operational needs, as well as corruption involving rogue port employees.

Underdevelopment and poor policing along the Kenyan coast and inefficient operations at container terminals, inland container depots (Nairobi) and private container freight stations,

lead to gaps and opportunities for illicit activities at Mombasa port. Satellite ports present a particularly high risk since they transit cargo from these small ports to the larger port of Mombasa through container terminals. Mombasa represents an important gateway for illicit trade of wildlife, drugs, counterfeit products, stolen cars, and arms. Technological sophistication, corruption and politics remain key facilitators of illicit activities through Mombasa port and criminal networks use sophisticated technology to conceal illicit goods in containers and exploit corruption to access ports.

The study recommends concerted national, regional and international efforts to deal with the identified risks; invest heavily in construction, maintenance and constant technological updates at the port; and improve coastline security through interventions at satellite ports. This approach proved successful for Durban port. Strengthening of security measures at Durban port has led to an illicit trade route shift from the port to Dar es Salaam, Mombasa and Uganda since 2012.





STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ENTERING THE WORKSHOP

In advance of the workshop, participants were asked to take a survey to assess their levels of awareness and knowledge about wildlife crime; capacity, drivers and motivations, as well

as levels of co-operation to address wildlife trafficking through maritime supply chains (questionnaire available in Annex I).

A short presentation on the findings of the survey was delivered by Mikhail Paltsyn, Project Technical Advisor, UNDP-GEF Project “Reducing Maritime Trafficking of Wildlife between Africa and Asia”. The survey was completed by 35 respondents: 15 from government agencies; nine from inter-governmental and international organisations; nine from NGOs and foundations; and two from the private sector. The presenter highlighted that awareness about IWT and its impacts was relatively high amongst all stakeholder groups, but knowledge of national and international legislation related to IWT was still generally low, particularly on the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards. Capacity in addressing IWT through supply chain security measures was indicated as low by government agencies, but high by the private sector. Automatic risk profiling, container scanning, container inspection, wildlife crime investigation, use of Mutual Assistance Agreements, prosecution of traffickers, and anti-corruption capacities were perceived as insufficient by government agencies.

Fulfilment of national and international commitments was viewed as an important driver for improving efforts to counter wildlife trafficking among government agencies;

while the private sector considered obtaining the status of “trusted operator” a more important driver. The level of inter-agency co-operation for effective risk profiling, container inspection, and seizure of illicit wildlife products was perceived as high amongst government agencies and the private sector, but low amongst NGOs and IGOs. Lower was the perception of the level of interagency co-operation when it came to crime intelligence, investigations on wildlife seizures and prosecution of wildlife traffickers. Similarly, the perception of public-private collaboration to counter IWT was relatively low across all stakeholder groups.

Following the presentation, participants took a collective review of the responses through group work; the group analysis generated insights about the current situation, challenges to be addressed, and what opportunities exist for collaboration to counter those, as summarised in Table 1. These insights were then further considered and discussed in more detail during the course of the workshop as part of a step-by-step approach to identify and prioritise appropriate solutions for seaports in Kenya’s context.

FEEDBACK PROVIDED DURING THE SURVEY REVIEW SESSION

<p>LEVEL OF AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE RELATED TO IWT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Knowledge and standards were noted as being low on wildlife trafficking issues across stakeholders. Within the private sector, small companies have especially the lowest levels of knowledge of the issue and the tools that could be used. ✓ Companies are aware that if cargo is found to contain illicit products, shippers and clearing agents risk heavy penalties such as confiscation of their ships or loss of business trust and reputation. However, many companies still lack due diligence on customers, allowing traffickers habitually to repeat illegalities.
<p>CAPACITY TO COUNTER IWT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Effective risk profiling should be given priority in building capacity of actors for successfully countering IWT. ✓ Joint Port Control Units represent an institutional example of an effective mechanism for inter-agency co-operation and use of existing capacity and should be enhanced further. ✓ Securing successful prosecution and conviction after seizures is still a major challenge and more efforts are needed to build the necessary capacity to achieve a high level of conviction rates. ✓ More capacity is needed to increase the ability to “follow the money” linked to IWT transactions. ✓ Lack of trust was seen as the major cause of a lack of information sharing related to IWT, rather than capacity. ✓ Countering IWT is not the sole responsibility of customs; custom officials don't have the full capacity to do so alone. Collective action and responsibility should be taken by all players including the transport sector.
<p>DRIVERS/MOTIVATIONS TO COUNTER IWT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Political will at all levels is critical in driving commitments and efforts to counter IWT. ✓ Achievement of better law enforcement results and/or advancing professionally; strengthening of the port secure environment with less criminal involvement in port operations; protection of business image and reputation; avoidance of reputational/ economic and legal problems were all seen as important drivers in taking actions against IWT. ✓ There was an interest among the private sector in increasing their capacity to obtain the status of trusted operators as a way to gain a competitive advantage while securing their supply chains from IWT.
<p>LEVEL OF CO-OPERATION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION TO COUNTER IWT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Co-operation amongst LE agencies in Kenya around IWT risk-profiling and seizures is relatively strong, but weaknesses exist on information sharing. For example, although scanning is undertaken for exports, the information from scanned images is only available to KRA and on request by other agencies. It is recommended that all scan reports be made available to all agencies through a platform/one-stop centre and that KWS would pair up with KRA on IWT related work. ✓ There is a good level of co-operation between the Port Control Units participating in the CCP (Kenya JPCU and the other PCUs in Africa, Asia), with an effective information sharing mechanism through the ContainerCOMM platform. ✓ Public-private sector co-operation could be improved. Participants appreciated the weekly Friday port stakeholder meetings (Port Community Charter - PCC), but felt that there was a lack of implementation of stakeholder recommendations. It was recommended that the Friday meetings be used to also share specific IWT updates along with feedback on related prosecution outcomes and the status of seized trophies. ✓ Other recommendations included continued awareness raising efforts; scaling up anti-corruption measures; training and capacity building for risk profiling; Enhancing the use of technology, e.g. use of scanners and sniffer canines; and creating a regional information sharing and loading of cargo.

TABLE 1

Summary of participants' collective feedback on the responses of a pre-workshop stakeholder survey on levels of wildlife crime awareness and knowledge; capacity; drivers and motivations; as well as levels of co-operation to address wildlife trafficking through maritime supply chains.

MARITIME SUPPLY CHAINS - IDENTIFYING VULNERABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES

To set the scene for the session, Boniface Nganga, General Manager of Operations, Ten Senses Africa (TSA) delivered a presentation illustrating how wildlife trafficking can affect legal business. TSA is a sustainable social enterprise that manages a value chain for fair trade, organic macadamia nuts from East Africa. It employs up to 400 staff and engages a network of 30,000 farmers and producers of macadamia

and cashew nuts. TSA spends about USD3.2 million annually to buy raw macadamia nuts from farmers, thus providing an important source of income to local farmers. Kenya is ranked #3 globally in macadamia production and produces 42,500 tonnes annually. Ninety-five per cent of TSA's production is exported through Mombasa port to Europe, USA, and Viet Nam.

HIGHLIGHTS ON IVORY TRAFFICKING IMPACTS ON MACADAMIA TRADE BUSINESS:

1. Ivory and macadamia have a close relationship. Often ivory is disguised as macadamia due to the close resemblance of polished macadamia shells and chipped ivory. After two cases of trafficked ivory disguised within cargos of macadamia and other nuts were discovered by Kenya Customs, TSA began to encounter challenges with its own nut exports;
2. Delayed shipments due to increased scrutiny and inspections at the ports started to disrupt the value chain with an extension of working capital cycles and loss of customer trust—also translating into increased product costs placing TSA and other nut exporters from Kenya at a competitive disadvantage on the international market;
3. The delays in the shipment could seriously impact the ability to sell the nuts before the end of “best before” periods;
4. Business image is under threat: end consumers might be uncomfortable with the industry as a potential conduit for wildlife trafficking;
5. Reduced sales by TSA translates to reduced income for the 30,000 smallholder producers, and hence lower farmer income levels.

The presentation was followed by an expert panel discussion by:

- Stanley Mutai, Assistant Port Security Officer, Kenya Port Authority (KPA)
- Juma Tellah, Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Ships Agents Association (KSAA)
- Trung Hieu Nguyen, Customs Officer, Viet Nam Customs
- Agnes Nabwire, Assistant Commissioner Enforcement, Uganda Revenue Authority (URA)
- Levi Kinoti, Vice Chairman, Kenya International Freight and Warehousing Association (KIFWA)

The discussion provided an opportunity for participants to learn more about the different stakeholder group perspectives with regard to challenges and security measures against IWT and other types of illicit business along maritime supply chains.

It was highlighted that private sector associations such as KIFWA and KSAA are developing or already have in place guidelines to vet new members, code of conducts and protocols to deal with members involved in illicit activities; and that the level of collaboration with government agencies such as KRA and KPA is overall positive.

Some of the vulnerabilities at the port were considered linked to a lack of co-ordination among government agencies based in situ and that the emerging cloning of container seals was also perceived as a serious issue.

Recommendations included: increased customs involvement upstream of the value chain, i.e. during container loading, particularly of high-risk products associated with concealment of ivory, such as macadamia that often faces challenges with full verifications at the port; and intensification of canine measures for wildlife detection at the port during random container inspection; currently, the canine units are mostly used to target suspicious cargo.





WHAT IS WORKING WELL AND KEY CHALLENGES HAMPERING EFFORTS TO COMBAT WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING ALONG MARITIME SUPPLY CHAINS

Building on the highlights from the expert panel discussions, participants were grouped into stakeholder roles and continued to share their perspectives on what is already working well and what key challenges keep hampering efforts to combat wildlife trafficking at different stages of maritime supply chains. Key findings from the group work are summarised in Table 2.

	WHAT HAS GONE WELL	REMAINING CHALLENGES
CUSTOMS	<p>Automation of Customs processes has generally been effective;</p> <p>Single Customs Declaration within Single Customs Territory systems has led to cost savings;</p> <p>Customs systems are accessible by other agencies and the ICMS (Integrated Customs Management System), once operational, will enable sharing of manifests to other LE agencies;</p> <p>There is relatively timely information exchange among LE agencies such as KRA, KWS, JPCU and Police. The BMC (Border Management Committee) also acts as a platform for co-ordination and exchange of information;</p> <p>Enforcement of Customs Laws and processes have been generally good, leading to improved compliance by exporters, their agents and other private sector players involved in the shipping process for import/export;</p> <p>Kenya has already been implementing the Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS) along with Rwanda, and Uganda;</p> <p>There is a platform to lodge complaints (Complaint Information Centre, CIC).</p>	<p>Corruption amongst some officials at the port still exists enabling illicit activities;</p> <p>There is still a lack of a comprehensive automated system for container risk profiling at the ports, especially for export; Electronic submission of cargo manifests through the ICMS and the operationalisation of CTS (Cargo Targeting System) will improve this situation. CTS will be able to target the manifests loaded in ICMS;</p> <p>Although almost all export cargo is subject to scanning, the inspection of export cargo does not follow the stringent measures used for imports;</p> <p>Late release of export documents from shipping companies to customs and other agencies has been an impediment in detection and interception of IWT;</p> <p>Gaps in co-ordination and collaboration amongst port stakeholders; the BMC (Border Management Committee) lacks a proper mechanism for information exchange;</p> <p>Surveillance weaknesses outside the port area (private Freight Container Stations as well as along the coast providing opportunities for trafficking);</p> <p>Lack of training (e.g. concealment techniques for Illegal Wildlife) and capacity amongst customs and other port stakeholders to tackle IWT;</p> <p>There is a need to bring all EAC countries into the RECTS; scale up the System to also include Exports; set up data sharing agreements between participating countries; and improve reaction time by Law Enforcement Mobile Units on suspicious behaviour like diversion from designated route, unusually long stop over, or attempt to open a container.</p>

<p>OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES</p>	<p>Good laws and policies exist at national level in Kenya;</p> <p>There is an established multi-agency mechanism (JPCU) that is working effectively;</p> <p>Enforcement agencies have embraced the use of technology and intelligence for investigations.</p>	<p>Corruption is still a major threat in countering IWT in the country;</p> <p>Current systems to aid law enforcement in profiling, tracking equipment or frontline verification/search tools are not always adequate;</p> <p>Low personnel capacity to perform wildlife products and timber species identification for CITES implementation;</p> <p>Even as scanning of import cargo occurs, the images are only available to customs and only available to other agencies on request.</p>
<p>PRIVATE SECTOR</p>	<p>Some exporters, e.g. Ten Senses Africa, stuff containers on their secure facility with the presence of KRA to avoid illicit trafficking;</p> <p>Shipping lines inspect all containers and take photos for integrity to make sure they can be locked securely and do not have hidden compartments. This is done before providing empty containers for stuffing;</p> <p>Shipping lines have client databases and conduct due diligence on each new client. They have a blacklist of clients complicit in trafficking or other wrongdoing;</p> <p>Shipping lines have security staff on board of a ship to prevent unauthorised entries to the vessels by traffickers and terrorists and Ship Tracking Systems to detect any unplanned stops and deviations from planned routes;</p> <p>Shipping lines periodically check their staff on integrity and connections with criminals;</p> <p>Shipping lines verify Bill of Lading with their clients to avoid any inconsistencies in container and seal numbers and declared goods;</p> <p>Shipping lines have trainings for staff on security issues;</p> <p>Full cargo manifest for export containers can be provided to customs for risk profiling in advance, however, this document is often incomplete.</p>	<p>Small exporters/manufactures sometimes do stuffing without KRA supervision obtaining the seal from a customs officer, leaving vulnerabilities for smuggling;</p> <p>Full cargo manifest for export containers is provided to customs only when all containers are loaded to a ship;</p> <p>The maritime corporate sector's awareness of IWT, how it affects business and the positive role that the sector could play to combat it, is still very low;</p> <p>Shipping companies have no trainings on illicit wildlife trade and other trafficking issues, but are interested to receive them;</p> <p>Export agents and supply chain participants lack or have very little knowledge of the benefits that the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program offers and very few agents actually participate in AEO in Kenya;</p> <p>Places where containers are staffed (especially Inland Container Deposits (ICDs) and Container Freight Stations (CFSs) are especially vulnerable to smuggling. Also, truckers (transportation) can be a vulnerable point due to illegal interference with cargo during transporting;</p> <p>Although some industry players observed strict Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, others did not, thus creating opportunities for IWT by untraceable shell companies;</p> <p>Although there has been a good degree of co-operation between government agencies and the private sector on commercial affairs, collaboration around the prevention, detection and interception of IWT was low; in particular, lack of information from Customs with regard to complicit export agents that could be included into companies' blacklist and be blocked from their supply chain.</p>

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND NGOS

High-level political goodwill to counter IWT has increased substantially across the world during the past decade (e.g. in China);

Data on wildlife seizures, wildlife trade and trends, for example, is available and accessible;

A number of countries listed under the NIAP process for their role in the global illegal ivory trade have strengthened their capacity to address it;

There is a good level of awareness of IWT amongst East African organisations, which brings diverse expertise to help tackling it;

Regional level organisations such as EAC and SADC supported by regional agreements can help address IWT;

Use of detection dogs is working well;

There is a positive relationship between NGOs, international organisations and government.

Language challenges to handle apprehended Asian criminals due to lack of in-house translation services;

Delays in conclusion of court cases;

Lack of proper legal frameworks with laws harmonised across relevant countries making e.g. mutual legal assistance on IWT cases ineffective;

Lack of common position among government agencies on how to e.g. dispose of wildlife trophies;

Lack of education and awareness on the value of wildlife and their conservation, especially among local communities;

Corruption is still a major threat in countering IWT at the port and elsewhere.



A photograph of a workshop session. In the foreground, a man with glasses is looking down at a document. In the middle ground, a man in a plaid shirt is speaking into a microphone. Behind him, a woman in a purple top is standing and looking towards the camera. To the left, another man is seated at a table. The room has white walls, a window with a plant, and a poster on the wall. The entire image has a blue tint.

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING WILDLIFE CRIME

Day 2 of the workshop sought to highlight possible solutions, actions and strategies in response to identified challenges and systemic gaps in countering IWT at Kenya's ports. Presentations on best practices from across sectors globally and stakeholder group sessions involving law enforcers, private sector, customs, IGOs and NGOs were used to inform and contribute to participants' discussions. Practical ideas for opportunities to strengthen maritime supply chains in the Kenyan context were brainstormed and further developed in Table 3.

BEST PRACTICES FROM ACROSS SECTORS

The United for Wildlife Transport Taskforce

Robert Campbell, The Royal Foundation and Tim Wittig, The Basel Institute for Governance

The United for Wildlife Transport Taskforce (UFW-TT) brings together many of the world's leading airlines, shipping companies, and logistics organisations as well as international organisations, inter-governmental organisations, and NGOs to achieve a common goal of countering IWT. The UFW-TT is co-ordinated by The Royal Foundation under the leadership of Prince William and Lord William Hague. The Transport Taskforce has 130+ member companies, each a signatory to the 2016 Buckingham Palace Declaration. It works towards creating a global movement of change within the transport sector to protect endangered species from illegal markets through awareness raising, intelligence-led action, and facilitating innovation and sharing of best practices. There have been several case studies in Africa and Asia where the industry has participated in combatting IWT, e.g. working with Customs

and law enforcement agencies to deter, detect, and interdict illegal wildlife shipments, e-learning online platforms for staff and third party trainings, awareness raising through mass media and installation of container X-ray scanners, and construction of offices for rangers using shipping containers. So far Transport Taskforce member companies have trained more than 68,000 industry employees on IWT issues, and the Taskforce's intelligence sharing system has helped facilitate a number of enforcement outcomes, to date: 52 law enforcement investigations supported, 19 shipments interdicted, and 12 trafficker arrests, including several leading to the disruption of major transnational IWT networks. The collaborative efforts have been successful with large members such as DP World, Emirates, DHL, Maersk, and MSC, amongst others.

The role of prosecutions in countering IWT and importance of KYC legal framework for all export actors in Kenya

Grace Makangu, Kenya's Office Director of Public Prosecution (ODPP), and Shamini Jayanathan, Space for Giants.

The ODPP has a mandate to prosecute all criminal cases in Kenya. Its prosecutorial work is highly evidence-led, and thus requires thorough investigation of each case, including on IWT. This calls for high professionalism in gathering evidence. So far, ODPP in conjunction with other concerned government agencies have attained 98% conviction rates for IWT-related crimes at the poaching level. However, challenges lie in resolving trafficking cases. Between 2000 and 2017, there were more large ivory seizures in Kenya than anywhere else in Africa, and more than anywhere else in the world aside from Viet Nam and Hong Kong, according to the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA 2018). Fourteen separate incidents uncovered 24,345 kg of tusks, mostly moving through Jomo Kenyatta International Airport or the Mombasa Port. Prosecutions have started in 10 of those cases. To date only one has led to a conviction that has now been overturned on appeal. The key challenge facing ODPP in resolving IWT cases has been lack of information on ownership in terms of origin

and consignees of intercepted wildlife and other illicit trafficking. Most of the containers involved in trafficking have had fictitious companies, addresses, emails, or phones behind them. Hence, it was impossible to find origin of illicit consignments. Recently the Wildlife Act was amended to tackle IWT by extending criminal liability to those who recklessly aid and abet import and export. This paves the way for due diligence requirements in this sector. However, more work to tie up due diligence loopholes in the law still needs to be done. A multi-stakeholder agencies initiative led by the Space for Giants project aims to help study loopholes and establish measures/reforms to compel clearing and shipping agents to comply with new Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements to be developed. The KYC framework used in the banking sector will be adapted for this purpose. An inception meeting on the KYC project is planned in mid-February 2020, to bring together government agencies and export agents to discuss and start to work on the framework.

World Customs Organization's Cargo Targeting System (WCO CTS)

Edmund Landy, UNODC

WCO CTS is an automated risk profiling system that allows fast and comprehensive analysis of cargo to detect suspicious consignments that can contain wildlife and other illicit goods. The CTS uses full cargo manifests provided by shipping lines for risk profiling of export, import, and transshipment containers. CTS is available for the 179 WCO Customs Administration members and each country

could request for its deployment. In each country, the CTS application is adjusted according to the national context and customs needs and is deployed on hardware (provided by WCO as part of the package). Currently, CTS is being deployed in 11 countries, including Kenya. Major benefits of CTS for countries include the following:

- Low Cost, Low Overhead, Sustainable Risk Assessment & Targeting Solution—no-cost software, free updates & upgrades, at-cost deployment package, very low ongoing operating costs;
- Best Practice Risk Assessment Capability—the WCO CTS has been developed with customs and shipping and airline industry best practices and expertise;
- User-friendly—the WCO CTS is simple and easy to use by a broad range of users with varying IT and risk assessment skills;
- Ready Access to Manifest Data—the WCO CTS provides immediate access to electronic, pre-arrival, manifest/bill of lading data from container shipping lines, airlines, NVOCCs and freight forwarders. It captures data on import, transshipment, transit and export containers unloaded or loaded in the country, as well as conventional air cargo and express consignments;
- Systematic, Effective and Timely Risk Assessment—the WCO CTS applies consistent risk criteria to all cargo records and provides instant results to users. For import, transshipment and transit containerized consignments, the WCO CTS will assist customs administrations profile and select high-risk consignments before the vessel arrives;
- Facilitation of Low-Risk Cargo—Systematic and timely risk assessment will provide a basis for the country to facilitate cargo not deemed to be high-risk;
- Efficient Allocation of Resources—The country will be able to direct operational resources—personnel, scanners and other tools—to those shipments that pose the greatest risk;
- Targeted Monitoring—The status of high-risk shipments can be monitored throughout the inspection cycle;
- Workflow Management—Risk assessment activities and inspection outcomes are captured by the WCO CTS;
- Management Oversight—The WCO CTS logs all user activities within the system.



Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) and SAFE Framework of Standards in East African Community (EAC)

David Dongo, Uganda Revenue Authority

The WCO SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade adopted by WCO in 2005. This unique international instrument ushered in modern supply chain security standards and heralded the beginning of a

new approach to the end-to-end management of goods moving across borders while recognising the significance of a closer partnership between customs and business. The SAFE Framework consists of four core elements:

- First, it harmonises the advance electronic cargo information requirements on inbound, outbound and transit shipments.
- Second, each country that joins the SAFE Framework commits to employing a consistent risk management approach to address security threats.
- Third, it requires that at the reasonable request of the receiving nation, based upon a comparable risk targeting methodology, the sending nation's customs administration will perform an outbound inspection of high-risk cargo and/or transport conveyances;
- Fourth, the SAFE Framework suggests benefits that customs will provide to businesses that meet minimal supply chain security standards and best practices, e.g. through the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programme.

The AEO programme started in the EAC in 2008 as a regional approach. It is an effective tool to prevent and detect wildlife and other illicit cargo and improve supply chain security. The total number of AEOs in the EAC has

exceeded 400 to date, which account for 11.6% of regional trade and contribute 9% to overall revenue collection in the region. Benefits that AEOs receive from customs are significant and include the following:

- Priority treatment of operators,
- Automatic release of entries,
- No physical examination of goods,
- Own choice of place for verification of goods,
- Participation in customs initiatives,
- Self-management of bonded warehouses,
- Tax exemptions,
- Specialised teams handling AEOs,
- Reduced cost of doing business,
- Reduced clearance time, and
- Expedited payment of refunds.

For example, for AEOs in the EAC clearance time has decreased from two days to four hours, and transit time from Mombasa to Kampala decreased from 13 days to three days, self-managed in bonded warehouses, improved compliance, and efficiency in resources allocation. However, there have also been challenges in uptake and adoption of the AEO programme in the EAC, which include lack of awareness on the programme benefits, wrong perception of the programme by some operators, capacity

by some operators to upscale their record documentation and automation of systems, and grey economy issues.

Therefore, SAFE Framework provides a consolidated platform to enhance world trade, ensure better security against terrorism and other forms of transnational crime including IWT, and increase the contribution of customs and trade partners to the economic and social well-being of nations.

KENYA WILDLIFE SERVICE AND THE K9 UNIT

In the afternoon of the second day, participants were given the opportunity to learn more about the work done by Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) and experience first-hand sniffer dogs in action. Two trained dogs accompanied by their handlers demonstrated their effectiveness in detecting ivory concealed in bags. Their accuracy from the randomly placed ivory, including hidden underneath a vehicle, was 100%.

BATING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING IN KENYA—THE ROLE OF KENYA WILDLIFE SERVICES (KWS)

KWS actively counters wildlife trafficking in Kenya through various measures. These include checking for wildlife trophies in cargo through sniffer dogs and checking of authenticity of permits issued for products under CITES Appendix I. Means used in concealment of wildlife trophies have included: carvings, paintings, wood consignments, use of fresh produce, use of frozen fish.

There has also been avoidance of scanners and mis-declaration of products. Use of briefcase companies has also been used in hiding the real owners of wildlife trophies. Key challenges have included lack of specialised equipment, e.g. scanners and detectors.

There have also been conflicting and overlapping laws across borders. There is a need to equip the agency and conduct trainings to build capacity of staff. There is also a need for collaboration amongst different stakeholders. No recent seizures were made at the port since 2017 due to stringent measures put in place, e.g. scanning of containers.



The KWS Canine Unit usually deploys dogs for detection of illegal wildlife products at the Mombasa seaport and the Moi International Airport in Mombasa. The KWS Canine Unit consists of four canines introduced in 2010 with support from the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF). The unit also consists of six dedicated canine handlers around the clock. Kennels and handlers living quarters were constructed as part of setting up the unit. Nathan Gichohi from AWF explained that an eight-week training course for both dogs and handlers

was undertaken in Arusha, Tanzania, before commissioning. Regular medical and efficacy check-ups are undertaken to ensure that the canines are effective and in good health. Certificates to that effect are issued for admissibility in court. Measures for withdrawal of canines that may become ineffective are also in place. The budget for maintenance of the canine unit is estimated to be USD250,000 annually and KWS is planning to establish another two canine units along critical wildlife trafficking routes in Kenya.



GENERATING SOLUTIONS & COLLABORATION GOING FORWARD



GENERATING SOLUTIONS AND COLLABORATION

MAPPING PRIORITY ACTIONS

Day 3 focused on identifying concrete solutions from participants based on the two days of discussions on ways to address IWT in Kenya. The session specifically focused on identifying practical activities, proposed means of delivery, key implementation players and target groups, as well as implementation timelines. The discussion was concluded by mapping of priority strategies and actions, and how to take them forward concretely through review of the proposed activities and/or tools. The outcome of the discussion is summarised in Table 3.

INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR KENYA'S SEAPORTS

Before participants discussed potential solutions to challenges identified during the previous two days, three presentations highlighting key interventions and opportunities in addressing IWT were held. These

interventions and opportunities targeting maritime supply chains in Kenya and regional seaports are summarised below:

1 The Container Control Programme (CCP)—Combating Wildlife Trafficking in Seaports and Airports

Javier Montano, Regional Coordinator CCP, UNODC

- At the heart of the CCP is the creation and training of multi-agency units called Port Control Units (PCUs/JPCUs) and Air-Cargo Control Units (ACCUs). Through risk profiling, these inter-agency units are created to minimise the risk of maritime containers and air-cargo shipments from being exploited and used for illicit activity and to facilitate legal trade (and raise state revenues). In Eastern Africa, the units particularly focus on the interdiction of illicit trafficking of drugs, arms and other illicit goods, including wildlife trafficking.
- The PCU's inter-agency co-operation mechanisms and units' training and the application of targeted and systematic profiling techniques facilitate the detection and expedite investigations into high-risk containers and air cargos. A key advantage of the PCUs and ACCUs is their ability to send and receive alerts from other units in the region and around the world, allowing effective co-operation and information sharing for collection, analysis and dissemination of container crime intelligence information, promotion of co-operation between national law enforcement agencies, and development of effective information sharing mechanisms. All units worldwide are interconnected through the WCO ContainerCOMM—a secure system to exchange information. CCP also promotes partnerships with the private sector.
- CCP currently has more than 100 operational units in 53 countries, including Kenya (Mombasa seaport), Tanzania, and Uganda and has plans for expansion to other countries in Africa.
- The programme helps strengthen borders, building interception and enforcement capacity at seaports and airports through specialised training to improve appropriate targeting, risk management for profiling. There are three phases of training: 1) theoretical training, 2) exchange visits for best practice learning, and 3) continuous mentoring.
- So far, the CCP units have seized 152 containers with illegal environmental products, with recent notable seizures of 3.2 tonnes of elephant ivory and 423 kilogrammes of pangolin scales in Kampala, Uganda. The programme is now also targeting training on detection of illegal fisheries products.
- Some of the lessons learnt from CCP include: staff rotation hampers continuity of trained personnel, public-private co-operation is vital, lack of human resources is a major problem across board, anti-corruption mechanisms need to be strengthened, strong co-ordination and mentorship is needed for port staff and continuous training and mentorship programmes are effective.

2 UNDP-GEF Project “Reducing Maritime Trafficking of Wildlife between Africa and Asia”

Mikhail Paltsyn, Project Technical Advisor, UNDP

- The project is part of the GEF-funded, World Bank-led Global Wildlife Program (GWP) and implemented by UNDP. The Project's objective is to reduce maritime trafficking of wildlife between Africa and Asia through strengthening capacity at seaports and improving South-South co-operation to combat wildlife trafficking. Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and Zanzibar are the project's primary seaport targets (the most implicated African seaports in wildlife trafficking from 2000–2017). It is a three-year project (2018–2021), with USD2,000,000 in GEF funding.
- The project's board consists of the World Bank, The Royal Foundation, UNDP and UNODC, but also co-operates with public agencies, private sector and regional and international programmes and projects.
- The project has been designed to address gaps at the target seaports, including: insufficient use of wildlife crime intelligence to intercept wildlife trafficking; limited skills in the regulation or implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and species identification; lack of automatic risk profiling to detect wildlife and other illicit trade; low conviction rates on wildlife seizures; low co-operation between

law enforcement and the private sector to prevent wildlife trafficking; and insufficient supply chain security.

- Key activities of the project at the selected seaports will include:
 - ✓ Port Stakeholder Workshops at Dar es Salaam and Mombasa Ports;
 - ✓ Strengthening Mombasa and Dar es Salaam Joint Port Control Units (JPCUs) on wildlife crime intelligence and CITES knowledge;
 - ✓ Introduction of automatic risk profiling systems to Mombasa and Dar es Salaam seaports;
 - ✓ Support of DNA analysis of ivory seizures in African and Asian countries to identify trafficking routes and criminal networks;
 - ✓ Development of wildlife crime awareness/security programmes and training courses for port-based private sector actors to improve supply chain security;
 - ✓ Development of a best practice guide for ports to control illegal wildlife trade based on the best available experiences in the world; and
 - ✓ Development of collaboration between African and Asian ports to address wildlife crime issues.

3 TRAFFIC's Transportation Initiatives

Monica Zavagli, Senior Project Officer, TRAFFIC.

- TRAFFIC through the Wildlife TRAPS project and the ROUTES Partnership has been providing support to the transportation and logistics sector, working with both umbrella industry associations such as the International Federation of Freight Forwarder Associations (FIATA) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), as well as individual companies in preventing wildlife trafficking along legitimate supply chains. The focus of this work centred around strengthening of industry standards and corporate operating procedures as well as increasing employees' awareness and capacity to prevent detect and report IWT. A number of awareness raising and training materials have been developed in multiple languages and can be accessed freely at www.routespartnership.org.
- In 2017 FIATA amended the minimum standards required to obtain the FIATA diploma in international freight forwarding to include "prevention of wildlife trafficking" and worked in partnership with TRAFFIC, launched a digital Course that arms freight forwarders with the info they need to protect their businesses from inadvertently transporting smuggled wildlife products and how to respond. The two hour course is free and currently available in English; the course is being translated into six additional languages: Chinese, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and Russian that will become accessible via www.fiatalearning.com as of March 2020.
- The Trade in Wildlife Information eXchange (TWIX) is an online tool developed to facilitate the exchange of information and to promote co-operation between law enforcement officers responsible to combat IWT and implement CITES. It was first established in Europe, then in Central Africa, followed by the Southern African Development Community, and its roll out is now underway in Eastern Africa (Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya) thanks to the financial support of USAID.

The discussion following the presentations emphasised that:

- It would be beneficial to enhance training and exchange visits among and between African and Asian JPCUs and the Joint Operation Centre (JOC) under the UNDOC/WCO Container Control Program and it was confirmed that the UNDP-GEF Project "Reducing Maritime Trafficking of Wildlife between Africa and Asia" will support this during 2020–2021.
- It was highlighted that the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct 2017 calls on the signatory states to co-operate to the fullest possible extent to repress transnational organised crime in the maritime domain that includes arms trafficking, trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances, and illegal trade in wildlife, among others; building on this tool, it was suggested to work closely with IMO to develop new guidelines to address IWT.

TABLE 3

Summary of priority actions identified by workshop participants to address IWT through Kenya's seaports (mainly Mombasa). The list of proposed stakeholders included in this table is not exhaustive; it was recognised that other members from the private sector, civil society, non-for profit organisations and academia may be able to contribute greatly to the implementation of these proposed activities.

PROPOSED ACTION	TARGET AUDIENCE	DELIVERY MECHANISMS	TYPE OF SUPPORT REQUIRED	TIMEFRAME	PROPOSED LEAD
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES					
STRENGTHENING DETECTION AND INTERCEPTION CAPACITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND PORT OPERATORS					
1. STRENGTHEN INTER-AGENCY APPROACHES	LE agencies Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) National Intelligence Service (NIS)	Support the Joint Operation Centre (JOC) to investigate wildlife and forest crimes; and support the role of the JPCU as the profiling arm of JOC for detection; Consultations between KRA and other government agencies to improve the data-sharing mechanism on wildlife seizures and scanner images; Roll-out of the Eastern Africa TWIX (trade in wildlife information exchange) to facilitate information exchange and regional co-operation between LE agencies across East Africa.	Political goodwill Capacity building Access to common systems/information Budgetary support MOTW UNDP-GEF project UNODC TRAFFIC (for TWIX)	2020–2022	MOTW KRA
2. ENHANCE EFFECTIVE USE OF EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGIES	KPA, KWS, KRA	Provide proper training for scanner personnel, e.g. on image analysis of wildlife products; Strong performance-based M&E in use of scanners to ensure that vulnerabilities in the system are reduced (e.g. swapping of images).	Budgetary support Technical assistance from IGOs and NGOs	2020–2022	KPA and KRA
3. SUPPORT EXPANSION OF CANINE UNITS FOR “REMOTE AIR SAMPLING” TO PORT LOCATION	KPA, KWS, KRA	Conduct feasibility assessment for Remote Air Sampling for Canine Olfaction (RASCO) technique at Mombasa port (including statistical sampling of the detection rate); Provide necessary equipment and facility for RAS at the port; Train at least two dogs and two handlers to work specifically on RASCO; Regular refresher for RASCO dogs and trainers at the port.	Initial capital Buy-in from government agencies, e.g. Kenya National Canine Strategy Technical assistance and Training (e.g. AfriGuard, Mechem, AWF)	2020–2022	Donors AWF UNODC

STRENGTHEN INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTION CAPACITIES					
4. CAPACITY BUILDING TO STRENGTHEN INVESTIGATIONS CAPABILITIES	Multi-agencies (e.g. KWS, KPA, KFS, KRA, KPS, National Intelligence Agency (NIS), ODPP, Judiciary, Coastguard)	Training needs assessment for members of Joint Operation Centre (JOC) and other agencies at Mombasa Port; Prioritisation of training; Technical assistance programmes; Specialised training, e.g. on scene of crime management.	Financial support Trainers and expertise INTERPOL UNODC US Homeland Security Investigations Space for Giants	2020–2022	UNODC
	KWS, KPA, KFS, KRA, KPS, NIS	Awareness raising seminars on FI (including what scene of the crime elements can contribute to FI); Networking opportunities for FI focal points.	Financial support Technical Expertise Training programmes UNODC, US HSI, INTERPOL, Basel Institute	2020–2022	EACC, UNODC
	ODPP, KWS, KRA, KFS, KPS	Establishment of an ODPP forum to support court case management; Development of a court case management system.	Leadership from ODPP Programmatic interventions towards case management NGO support for judicial monitoring of verdicts and sentencing for IWT cases	2020–2022	ODPP
CROSS-CUTTING ACTION					
7. PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ON INFORMATION SHARING	LE agencies Private sector associations	Use Mombasa Port Community Charter (PCC) meetings to provide regular updates on illicit wildlife and other trafficking cases and trends with the private sector; Establish a public-private steering group that can advise on intel sharing; reporting and feedback on suspicious cases, and other opportunities for future collaboration.	Technical Expertise KPA support Leadership from LE agencies and Private sector associations UfW		KRA KYFWA KSAA
	All port based-government agencies responsible to combat IWT, e.g. KPS, KWS, KPA, KRA, MOTW EACC	Enhancement of internal accountability and anti-corruption systems, e.g. by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening mechanisms to report corruption, • Establishing organisational disciplinary measures and reward systems, • Improving internal control systems, • Enhancing existing Integrity Codes and develop new ones where needed, and • Improving salary and other incentives; Awareness raising campaigns.	Financial support Technical Expertise Technical assistance programmes UNODC EACC Basel Institute ISS UNODC KPA Head of Ethics & Integrity KRA – Ethics and Integrity Investigation Officer	2020–2022	EACC
8. STRENGTHEN ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES					

KENYA REVENUE AUTHORITY – SPECIFIC					
9. ENHANCE “AUTOMATION” AND TRANSPARENT INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEMS	KRA Clearing agents	Roll out activation of the Cargo Targeting System (CTS) for container risk profiling with KRA's new Integrated Customs Management Systems (ICMS) for seamless automated manifest submission before arrival of cargo at port; Hire a dedicated data analyst to support CTS; Training for trainers and mentoring of Customs and JPCUs on the use of CTS in every-day practice.	Financial support Technical Expertise UNODC WCO UNDP-GEF Project	2020–2022	KRA
	KRA	Conduct a training needs assessment; Incorporate relevant IWT information into the official customs training curriculum; Cascade knowledge from experienced staff through class and on-the-job training (retiring/exiting officers as part of a board and/or mentorship program); Set up exchange visit opportunities to learn from successful experiences on profiling skills and container inspection at other ports.	Financial support Technical Expertise UNODC CCP UNDP-GEF Project TRAFFIC	2020–2022	KRA
	KRA	Set up in-house confidential administrative vetting by a special panel (Senior Officers) for staff to serve in sensitive units (e.g. JPCU Units).	EACC guidance on vetting policy for government staff KRA	2020–2021	KRA
PRIVATE SECTOR					
12. EXPAND THE AUTHORIZED ECONOMIC OPERATOR PROGRAMME (AEO) WITH FOCUS ON WILDLIFE CRIME IN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY	EAC Customs AEO programme business associations (e.g. KSAA, KYFWA, CFSA, TASAA, TAFFA) individual companies KRA, KPA, PMAESA	Convene an awareness forum on the AEO programme among EAC business community connected to seaports and exports, with focus on wildlife crime; Deliver technical meetings and trainings on AEO, e.g. in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda; Provide assistance to “champion” companies in the implementation of the AEO programme.	Technical Expertise from: EAC AEO programme Experts WCO Experts AEO members FEAFFA Financial support from UNDP-GEF Project	2020–2021	EAC Secretariat AEO programme KRA, TRA, URA

<p>13. PROPOSAL AND DEVELOPMENT OF IMO GUIDELINES TO PREVENT AND DETECT WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING</p>	<p>IMO Shipping lines KSAA CFSA KMA TASAA</p>	<p>Consultations with IMO and drafting of a proposal for approval by FAL 44 to develop guidelines for IWT prevention; Convene a workshop to review the draft recommendations with shipping lines, associations and other relevant stakeholders; Development of anti-trafficking assistance programs for the implementation of the new guidelines via IMO training centres.</p>	<p>Political will of the FAL Convention parties IMO experts Technical assistance from UNDP-GEF Project and TRAFFIC</p>	<p>2020-2022</p>	<p>IMO, KMA</p>
<p>14. DEVELOP AND INTRODUCE A “KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER” (KYC) FRAMEWORK FOR EXPORT AGENTS IN KENYA</p>	<p>ODPP KRA KMA KWS Anti-Money Laundering Commission SfG Private Sector (associations and companies)</p>	<p>Initiation meeting of government agencies to discuss KYC framework, related requirements and next steps; Drafting of KYC legal framework and supporting documents; Consultations with private sector to address concerns; Gazettement of KYC framework by the Government; Capacity building for LE agencies and private sector on the framework implementation.</p>	<p>Government uptake Financial support Expertise by ODPP and SfG; TRF UNDP-GEF Project UNODC</p>	<p>2020-2021</p>	<p>ODPP, SfG, KRA</p>
<p>15. STRENGTHEN INFORMATION SHARING MECHANISMS AMONG PRIVATE SECTOR AND CUSTOMS, SPECIFIC TO IWT</p>	<p>Private Sector (associations and companies) KRA, KPA, PMAESA Port Community Charter (PCC)</p>	<p>Consultations and assessment with the private sector, KRA, TPA and PMAESA on the types of information to be shared, level of confidentiality and accessibility; and follow up discussion on the best mechanism for doing that; Share regular updates on IWT and other trafficking cases at PCC meetings (KRA to share safe info with private sector for actions); Explore feasibility for the establishment of an online platform by the private sector to share information on illicit wildlife and other trafficking cases and best practices to combat it at seaports.</p>	<p>Financial support for consultations Associations' leadership Technical expertise UfW Transport Taskforce</p>	<p>2020-2022</p>	<p>KPA, KSAA</p>
<p>16. PROMOTE THE USE OF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY AMONG MARITIME BUSINESS ENTITIES IN EAST AFRICA</p>	<p>Private Sector (associations and individual companies) EAC Secretariat KPA, KRA, KMA</p>	<p>Consultation with blockchain experts on existing supply chain blockchain solutions (e.g. TRADELENSE); Convene an awareness and best practice sharing forum and trainings on supply chain blockchain use for private sector, Customs, and other gov. agencies.</p>	<p>Financial support Blockchain experts KRA USAID EAC Customs Union UfW transport and financial taskforces</p>	<p>2020-2022</p>	<p>EAC Secretariat</p>



NEXT STEPS AND CLOSING REMARKS

During the last session of the workshop, participants worked together to refine and ground-truth priority activities further. While these actions were grouped in Table 3 under three main stakeholder categories, i.e. law enforcement agencies, customs and private sector, there was a strong recognition of the important supporting and convening role played by NGOs and IGOs spanning from data analysis to financial support.

The proposed work mostly aims at enhancing and strengthening systems and processes that already exist at the port of Mombasa, and more broadly in Kenya, such as the application of the Cargo Targeting System (CTS) for automated risk profiling and the expansion of the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programme to strengthen supply chain security with a specific focus on IWT. Some technical and financial resources have been pledged to support a number of these priority activities, but strong leadership by all stakeholders and additional funding will be required for the overall successful implementation of this plan of action.

Private sector representatives stressed the need for more awareness raising about the risks brought by IWT across their sector; as well as called for clearer asks by customs and other government agencies and more regular feedback on information provided to them.

The discussions also noted that concealment of illicit wildlife products in containers often happens before these reach the ports and are loaded onto the ships, therefore calling for increased security checks at container freight stations and depots, as well as other actions upstream the supply chain. Increased regional and international co-operation should also be strengthened to ensure that investigation and prosecution of IWT offenders can be scaled up and expanded to dismantle entire criminal networks.

Stronger political will coupled with donor financial support were seen as critical ingredients to increase positive action along trade chains through inter-agency and public private partnerships to intercept and investigate IWT cases. On the other hand, corruption was still perceived as the main underlying factor hindering Kenya's efforts to address IWT and other forms of trafficking.

In closing the 3-day workshop on behalf of the organising committee, **UNDP representative Lisa Farroway** took the opportunity to thank partners, speakers and participants for their support, keen interest and participation in workshop discussions that contributed to a better understanding of

challenges and needs to combat IWT through Mombasa port. She highlighted that the need for collaboration, cooperation and information sharing was repeatedly emphasised by different stakeholder groups, underlining the importance of this event bringing together different stakeholders in a unified dialogue. Ms. Farroway further noted that workshop organising partners were looking forward to continue the dialogue from this workshop and work together on deploying solutions identified during discussions. The workshop recommendations and actions will be presented to and discussed with Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Tourism and Wildlife for action with support from the CCP, TRAFFIC-led initiatives, and the UNDP-GEF project under the Global Wildlife Program, as well as through building linkages to the national GWP project led by the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife with support of UNDP.

The workshop report will be shared with participants, forming the foundation for future collaboration and communication aimed to improve the Port's security, efficiency, and capacity to tackle IWT.

Closing remarks from **Mr. Swaleh Faraj, representative of the Kenya Revenue Authority**, stressed that the workshop came at an appropriate time when threat assessments had clearly indicated the need for multi-stakeholder efforts in addressing IWT. He encouraged all participants to commence implementation of solutions identified during the event, individually and as institutions.

UNDP, UNODC, TRAFFIC and WWF will continue to support activities identified in Table 3 within their capacities and mandate; share best practices from other countries with Kenya port stakeholders and help leverage Kenya's achievements with other ports globally.

The workshop was lauded for its engaging and participatory format, creating a unique platform that fostered open dialogue, trust and renewed commitments to counter wildlife trafficking among the diverse groups of maritime stakeholders.

ANNEX I

Pre-Workshop Questionnaire: Countering Wildlife Trafficking Through Kenya's Seaports

1. Stakeholder type: please select the category that best represents your affiliation *

- Government Agency
- NGO/Foundation
- Private Company/Association
- Intergovernmental/International Organisation
- Embassy
- Other

2. If 'other', please specify

WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING DIMENSIONS

3. In my organisation, KNOWLEDGE of the following is...

(Options: High, medium, low, I don't know)

- Detrimental impacts from wildlife trafficking (e.g. loss of revenue, spread of diseases, increase in violence, and corruption, extinction of animal and plant species)
- Level of wildlife trafficking through maritime supply chains
- Role of Mombasa port in wildlife trafficking
- Roles and mandates of relevant government agencies in addressing wildlife trafficking
- Reliance of wildlife traffickers on legitimate (maritime) transport and logistics services
- Exploitation and concealment methods used by wildlife traffickers (e.g. creation of front companies, misdeclaration, container modification)
- Links between wildlife crime and other illicit commodities such as drugs, counterfeit products, and weapons

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION AND POLICIES

4. In my organisation, KNOWLEDGE of the following is... *...

(Options: High, medium, low, I don't know)

- CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora)
- National legislation related to wildlife protection and trade, including restrictions, prohibitions, implications of non-compliance and penalties related to illicit wildlife trade
- National legislation and regulations regarding enforcement officers' powers of search and seizure/chain of custody procedures
- SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade and Authorized Economic Operator program
- Regulations regarding advance electronic data requirements (cargo and goods declarations and risk management methodology)

COMPANY/ INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND STANDARDS

5. In my organisation, KNOWLEDGE of the following is... *

(Options: High, medium, low, I don't know)

- Organisational / company policies and standards to address trafficking of wildlife and other illicit goods
- Transport industry initiatives that address wildlife trafficking (e.g. the United for Wildlife Transport Taskforce)

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

6. In my organisation, CAPACITY (systems, knowledge and skills) to implement the following is... *

(Options: Strong, medium, weak, not applicable, I don't know)

- Customs-private sector supply chain security initiatives (e.g. the Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) program of SAFE Framework of Standards)
- Supply chain risk assessments that address wildlife trafficking, including due diligence on clients and logistics service providers
- Measures to ensure physical integrity and security of containers, including inspection, storage, staffing and transportation
- Physical access control to prevent unauthorized entry to terminals, facilities, and ships
- Personnel security measures to screen prospective employees and to periodically check current employees
- Regular security training and awareness programs for staff on wildlife crime and other illicit trafficking issues
- Customs – private sector cooperation on information sharing (e.g. full cargo manifest)

RISK PROFILING / INTELLIGENCE / INSPECTION / DETECTION / INTERCEPTION

7. In my organisation / company / agency, CAPACITY (systems, knowledge and skills) to implement the following is... *

(Options: Strong, medium, weak, not applicable, I don't know)

- Wildlife crime intelligence collection, analysis and deployment for targeted container inspections
- Advanced risk profiling system to identify high-risk cargo of illicit wildlife products
- Reporting systems (inter-agency and inter-sectoral) for suspicious wildlife cargo
- Use of container scanners for inspection of shipments for wildlife and other contraband
- Container inspection (e.g. 7-point inspection) and search operations, including K9 units
- Identification of CITES-listed animal and plant species, and their derivatives

INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, AND ANTI-CORRUPTION

8. In my organisation / company / agency, CAPACITY (systems, knowledge and skills) to implement the following is... *

(Options: Strong, medium, weak, not applicable, I don't know)

- Evidence collection and chain of custody of wildlife seizures
- Wildlife crime investigation, including forensics, backtracking and financial investigation
- Use of mutual assistance agreements or MoU to help with investigations and special joint operations on wildlife trafficking cases
- Prosecution of wildlife traffickers
- Anti-corruption and staff integrity tools and programs (e.g. WCO Arusha Declaration on integrity)

DRIVERS

9. My organisation has the following DRIVERS for improving efforts to counter wildlife trafficking ...*

(Options: Strong, medium, weak, not applicable, I don't know)

- Fulfil national and or international commitments such as under Tanzania's national strategy to combat wildlife trafficking, CITES, ICCWC, etc
- Fulfil commitments as a signatory of the UfW's Transport Taskforce Buckingham Palace Declaration
- Protect/build image and reputation
- Achieve better law enforcement results and, or advance professionally
- Avoid reputational/economic and legal problems as a consequence of wildlife seizures
- Obtain a status of "trusted operator" for competitive advantage
- Increase the secure environment of the port with less criminal involvement in port operations
- Sustainable Development Goals

COOPERATION

10. Between different stakeholders, I perceive CO-OPERATION in the following areas to be...*
(Options: strong, medium, weak, I don't know)

- Inter-agency cooperation for effective risk profiling, container inspection, and seizure of illicit wildlife products
- Inter-agency cooperation for wildlife crime intelligence, investigations on wildlife seizures and prosecution of wildlife traffickers
- International cooperation between countries to intercept wildlife trafficking and tackle larger wildlife trafficking networks
- Cooperation and information exchange between private sector (e.g. shipping), government agencies (e.g. Customs) and non-governmental organisations to ensure security of supply chain, prevent and detect illicit trade
- Transfer/exchange of knowledge, experiences and lessons around countering wildlife trafficking

11. What are the best opportunities to counter wildlife trafficking at Mombasa and other African ports in your opinion?

12. Any other comments?

13. Please indicate the business area in which you work (e.g. security, management, operations, container handling, business development)

14. Please indicate the country/region you work in*

Optional: Your name and/or affiliation

IMAGE CREDITS

Unless, otherwise stated, all images are licensed under Creative Commons 2.0 Non-Attribution.
All workshop photos are copyright of Tamara Tschentscher / UNDP.

PAGE	<i>Credit</i>
2, 3, 5	World Customs Organization
8	TRAFFIC
9	John E. Newby / WWF
11, 15	TRAFFIC



“ Strong collaboration across the regions and continents is very important to strengthen efforts to combat Illegal Wildlife Trade. Especially through intelligence information sharing and exchange of best practices.”

Ronely Sheen

Executive Director, Tanggol kalikasan (Defense of nature), Philippines

“ Illicit trafficking of fauna and flora is a serious and transnational organized crime, inter-agency cooperation is key in fighting these crimes. I am pleased to see the positive exchanges between the port stakeholders participating at this workshop, sharing best practices and collectively identifying practical measures to better face this threat.”

Javier Montano Duran

UNODC

“ What’s the link between Ivory? Traffickers disguise Ivory as Macadamia nuts as they look quite similar to an untrained eye. Its paramount to create awareness, train and equip supply chain state holders with basic identification skills.”

Boniface Nganga

Ten Senses Ltd.

“ To reduce wildlife trafficking we should have a very strong multi-agency cooperation among all stakeholders and further strengthen wildlife laws enforcement in the region.”

Jane Birungi

Liason Manager Rwanda Revenue Authority, Kenya Station

“ Illegal wildlife trade must be made unprofitable and extremely uncomfortable. We must join hands to help each other so that we stay a step ahead of the criminals.”

Najib Balala

Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife

“ It is not possible to prosecute an anonymous person, there has to be a name, a face, there has to be proper identification. It is hard to bring the owners of the illicit cargo to book if they are unknown. Everyone therefore has a role to play in stopping illicit wildlife products trade. It starts with getting the identity of the suspect right. To all the shipping agents, clearing agents, forwarders, loaders please know your customer, by doing so you are making a difference.”

Grace Mukangu

Prosecution counsel Office of Director of Public Prosecutions, Kenya



“ To stop wildlife crime we need to ensure that we close the key transit routes like Mombasa port. It is not enough to stop poaching in our country if we are a transit route for the rest of Africa. To do this it takes cooperation between various government agencies, private sector and other stakeholders.”

Drew McVey

East Africa Wildlife Crime Technical Advisor, WWF-Kenya

“ We are committed as customs to promote a government and industry partnership and collaboration to combat and eradicate illicit wildlife trafficking and environmental crime to protect our national heritage.”

Swaleh Faraj

Manger, Customs Enforcement, Mombasa

“ Wildlife trafficking is a complex crime. A crime which cannot be successfully prosecuted without collaborations. There is need to sensitize the general public on the negative impact of wildlife trafficking on nature, economically and socially.”

Ahmed Bello Ale

Team Manager, Intelligence Unit, Nigeria Customs Service, Apapa ,Lagos

“ We treat these dogs as officers because they assist us to detect illegal wildlife products Since the introduction of sniffer dogs, we have made more arrests and seizures. We have managed to detect and deter wildlife contrabands at the Kenya Ports Authority, Moi international Airport and border points like Lungalunga. Without dogs we wouldn't have achieved what we have so far. They therefore play an important role.”

Corporal Emmanuel Wafula

KWS Mombasa Canine Unit

“ The blame game will not stop illegal wildlife trade. It's our concerted efforts that will. To fight this illicit trade in wildlife products, there must be a multiagency approach everyone along the trade supply chain has a role to play. Everyone is important. Everyone can make a difference. We must adhere to the regulations that are in place, embrace the know your client campaign and exercise due diligence. Without collaboration this fight will be in futility.”

Agnes Nabwire

Assistant Commissioner Customs Enforcement, Uganda Revenue Authority

“ This workshop is very important because it contributes to our national wildlife strategy, 2030.”

Prof. Fred Segor CBS

Principal Secretary, Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife

TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring network, is a leading non-governmental organisation working globally on trade in wild animals and plants in the context of both biodiversity conservation and sustainable development.

For further information contact:
TRAFFIC
Global Office
David Attenborough Building
Pembroke Street
Cambridge CB2 3QZ
UK

Telephone: +44 (0)1223 277427
E-mail: traffic@traffic.org
Website: www.traffic.org

UK Registered Charity No. 1076722,
Registered Limited Company No. 3785518.

